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Abstract 
 
Innovation policy has become an integral part of modern industrial policy.  This paper 
considers the role of innovation and place through the lens of UK innovation policy.  It 
argues that much of innovation policy is focused on the generation of innovations and not 
the diffusion and adoption of innovations throughout the economy.  This focus will do little 
to slow or reverse regional diverges in economic performance. Innovation policy at the local 
level requires greater focus on innovation diffusion whilst adopting both a wider perspective 
to encompass the variety of innovations and a narrower perspective to focus on the specific 
innovation needs of individual regions or localities.   
 
Keywords: innovation, innovation policy, place  




A focus on innovation is now a central feature of the re-emergence of place-based industrial 
policy (HM Government, 2017; OECD, 2011;  OECD, 2013; Warwick, 2013).  Yet, much of the 
focus is narrowly confined, and potentially distorted, by messages coming from science and 
from economics.  From science, the foci are investing resources in STEM (science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics) and improving the commercialisation of science 
through technology transfer (often through patents, licenses and spin-outs).  From 
economics, the focus is on the operation of markets and thus the policy instruments that 
are required when markets may ‘fail’. In the realm of innovation, private firms may not 
invest in a level of R&D that is socially optimal, therefore this ‘failure’ has to be rectified by 
government intervention through publicly funded R&D or subsidies or tax-breaks.  Although 
science and R&D are important - they are only parts of the innovation process.  It is 
important to stress three points.  First, innovation takes place within a multi-level system 
and a preoccupation with ‘markets’, where the price mechanism allocates scarce resources, 
may ignore the important links, connections and feedback loops within the system.  Second, 
local innovation systems will vary and will reflect different structures and trajectories of 
development.  Third, R&D and technology transfer tend to be associated with the 
generation of innovations and not the diffusion and adoption of innovations throughout the 
economy. Since the industrial revolution, the diffusion of innovation has had a much larger 
impact on economic growth that the generation of innovation as ‘innovation-using sectors’ 
are much larger than ‘innovation-generating’ sectors. During the Industrial Revolution it was 
not the invention of a ‘wave of gadgets’ that generated growth but it was the use of such 
gadgets – such as the steam engine being deployed in the factory system. Similarly, the 
largest impact of information communication technologies is not through invention but by 
use throughout the economy by businesses, individuals and governments.    
 
This paper considers the innovation policy through the lens of policy initiatives in the UK 
including the latest turn of place-based innovation policy. This paper is organised as follows. 
Section 1 outlines the convincing but incomplete narrative of how innovation influences 
economic growth, a narrative that primarily draws on lessons from economics and science.  
Section 2 summarises the recent evolution of innovation policy within the broader 
framework of industrial policy in the UK.  Section 3 considers the limitations of modern 
innovation policy and argues for a greater emphasis on innovation diffusion. Section 4 
considers spatial variations in productivity and the conventional approach to spatial 
innovation policy. Section 5 outlines an alternative approach to spatial innovation policy and 
argues for a broadening of perspective to encompass the varieties of innovation combined 
with a narrower perspective that focuses on the specific innovation needs of a region or 
local and the importance of innovation diffusion. The final section concludes. 
 
  
1. Innovation: the conventional narrative 
 
Developments in science and technology are considered central to economic growth as 
shown in the contributions of Schumpeter (1947) and developments in neoclassical growth 
theory (Solow, 1956, and Romer, 1990).  In conventional exogenous growth models, such as 
the Solow-Swan model (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956), a permanent increase in per capita 
growth is only achievable through technological progress which is exogenous and so can be 
considered as ‘manna from heaven’ (Davenport, 1985, p.139). Simply, technology is 
determined by the ideas that are generated by scientific discovery which is not influenced 
by economic processes or incentives. Developments in neoclassical growth theory led to the 
development of endogenous growth models that suggested that economic growth is 
primarily endogenous and not determined by external factors (Romer, 1990).   Some 
vintages of endogenous growth theory suggest that there are positive externalities or 
spillover effects of  investments in technology or related areas. Thus, endogenous growth 
models suggest that policy can improve the growth rate of an economy if policy makers can 
identify the correct areas to support. 
 
The rise of endogenous growth theory provided a rationale and a framework for growth 
policy. In the UK in 1994, the shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that a Labour 
Government’s economic approach would be rooted in ‘post neoclassical endogenous 
growth theory’ although it was unclear in what way the policy was ‘post neoclassical’ as 
opposed to neoclassical (Brown, 1994).  Later, the leader of the Labour Party at the time 
(Tony Blair) provided a more pithy and more intelligible version when he said that his 
economic priorities were ‘education, education, education’ (Blair, 1996).   
 
The pervasive influence of modern orthodox economics helped to provide an apparently 
compelling narrative on how to stimulate economic growth and productivity.  The key driver 
is technology which, in turn, depends on investment in R&D. And the private sector may not 
invest in R&D at a socially optimum rate as individual firms who may invest in R&D will not 
gain all the benefits of such investments as other firms may benefit from the new ideas that 
are generated. Economists focus on the operation of markets, and this is one case where 
markets ‘fail’ which provides a justification to remedy the market failure by policies that 
stimulate R&D through Government expenditure, subsidies, tax incentives or other means 
(Crafts, 1996).  In part, this reflects that policies have emerged from the framework of 
orthodox growth theory with its emphasis on markets and technology, with place, at best, a 
subsidiary factor and, at worst, largely ignored. Of course, there are alternatives to the 
orthodoxy – but these are less prominent in the policy discourse.  Evolutionary growth 
theories suggest that ‘invention alone is insufficient; it must be translated into innovation, 
which depends greatly on specific knowledge of time and place and conjectures of market 
opportunity, quite different dimensions of knowing (Metcalfe and Foster, 2010. 
p.64).  Furthermore, cumulative causation models stress how demand and supply factors 
may interact at the local level to cause ‘virtuous cycles of growth’ and ‘vicious cycle of 
decline’ leading to spatial economic divergences and creating major challenges for policy 
(Kaldor, 1970). 
 
The simple but powerful narrative that emerges from orthodox economics has been 
reinforced by the influence of the science lobby in many countries. There has been 
emergent divisions on the role of different academic disciplines with the notion that 
investment in the ‘hard’ sciences will deliver bigger ‘impact’ on the economy and the 
standard of living. According to the UK Government: ‘At a time when the pace of scientific 
discovery and innovation is quickening across the world, the UK is fortunate to be a nation 
of science and technical progress. We have three of the world’s top 10 universities, and 12 
of the top 100. Of the G7 countries, the UK has the most productive science base and we 
rank first in many key global measures of research quality. These academic achievements 
have practical benefits for our economy, with firms investing into the UK to access our 
research.’ (HM Government, 2017, p.25) 
 
In ‘The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution', C.P. Snow  (1959) identified the 
emergence of two cultures within academia: one comprising scientists and the other Snow 
termed ‘literary intellectuals’. Snow’s view was that 'the former are in favour of social 
reform and progress through science, technology and industry’ whereas intellectuals are 
‘natural Luddites’ in their understanding of and sympathy for advanced industrial society' 
(Critchley, 2001, p. 49). The role of the ‘scientists’ informs much of the debate on how 
academia can boost growth with a focus on educating STEM (science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics) graduates; investing in science research through R&D and 
other mechanisms; and encouraging impact through the commercialisation of science often 
through technology transfer mechanisms such as patents, licenses and spin-outs. 
 
The combination of powerful science and economics lobbies has provided a convincing 
narrative which was (and is) politically convenient.  It is a simple story with easily 
understandable links and processes.  Furthermore, it is relatively uncontroversial as few  
object to supporting science and scientists. Moreover, it can be a relatively cheap way to 
accumulate political capital, with Government ministers being seen opening new 
laboratories or dressed in white lab coats conversing with scientists.  The conventional 
wisdom is captured in the innovation policy framework in the UK:  ‘Our industrial strategy 
will launch a major upgrade in the role of science and innovation in our economy for the 
years ahead. It will build on our world-leading science base and hardwire innovation into 
our businesses, schools, workforce and individuals. We will: Substantially increase 
investment in R&D and ensure that UK research continues to be world class’  (HM 
Government, 2017, bold in the original).  Similarly, the EU has identified the following 
innovation challenges for the EU:  ‘(1) lack of quality of the science base; (2) feeble 
contribution of the science base to the economy and society; and (3) inadequate framework 
conditions for business R&D and innovation (European Commission, 2014).  And has 
identified the following policy priorities: ‘The EU is implementing policies and programmes 
that support the development of innovation to increase investment in research and 
development, and to better convert research into improved goods, services, or processes 
for the market’ (European Commission, online). 
 
 
2. The innovation turn in industrial policy:  addressing the productivity challenges 
 
Innovation has been the prime long-term driver of economic growth since the Industrial 
Revolution. The UK was the productivity leader in the mid-nineteenth century but since 
then other countries have caught up and many have surged ahead (Broadberry and Irwin, 
2004).  Figure 1 shows the productivity gap (in terms of gross domestic product per worker) 
between the UK and many other advanced countries (G7) in 2015 and 2016.  It shows that 
the UK had a significant gap with the rest of the G7 overall and with individual countries 
with the exceptions of Japan and Canada.  Figure 2, which shows gross domestic product 
per hour worked in the G7, also shows a significant gap. The differences in the pattern of 
productivity between Figures 2 and 3 reflects differences in average hours worked across 
the countries. The productivity gap between the UK and the US is wider in terms of output 
per worker than in terms of output per hour because US workers work more hours than UK 
workers.  Conversely, the productivity differential between the UK, and Germany and 
France is wider in terms of output per hour than in terms of output per worker, as German 
and French workers work fewer hours than their UK counterparts. 
 
[Figures 1, 2 and 3 here] 
 
Since the financial crisis and Great Recession there has been a slowdown in productivity 
growth in many advanced countries. Figure 3 shows the productivity slowdown in the G7 
countries since the financial crisis which has been particularly stark in the UK. There has 
been considerable debate about the productivity slowdown or ‘productivity paradox’ (see 
Crafts, 2018).  There are three broad strands to this debate.  First, that the slowdown is a 
mirage or artefact as national income accounts fail to capture the full impact of 
technological change especially in the digital age (Ahmad and Schreyer, 2016).  Second, that 
the slowdown is a temporary phenomena. According to Moryr, there is no evidence of 
diminishing returns to technological progress, and ‘science and technology’s main function 
in history is to make taller and taller ladders to get to the higher-hanging fruits (and to plant 
new and possibly improved trees)‘ (OECD-NBER, 2014, p.6).  Third, and most worryingly, the 
slowdown is a permanent phenomenon.  Gordon has argued that the productivity 
slowdown reflects a lack of growth-enhancing innovations: recent General Purpose 
Technologies (GPT), such as ICT, have had a smaller impact impact on growth compared to 
previous GPTs such as electrification and the internal combustion engine (OECD-NBER, 
2014, p.5).  Gordon (2016) has argued that the persistent economic growth witnessed since 
the industrial revolution was unique and cannot be expected to continue in the future.  
Krugman has asked whether Gordon  is right; and has reassured us that the answer is ‘a 
definite maybe’ (Krugman, 2016). 
 
The policy agenda to address the productivity challenges in the UK has waxed and waned 
over the past 20 years. The election of the Labour Government in 1997 saw a slight 
movement away from the free market policies of the previous Thatcher and Major 
Governments where industrial policy was castigated as ‘picking-winners’ and distorting the 
efficient operation of market forces.  Labour adopted a ‘third way’ approach to productivity 
and identified five key drivers; skills, enterprise, innovation, competition and investment 
(Balls et al., 2004; HM Treasury, 2000; Kitson et al, 2004).  The innovation driver aimed to 
promote ‘world class science and innovation in the UK’ and collectively the drivers aimed to 
‘improve the economic performance of all English regions and reduce the gap in economic 
growth rates between regions (HM Treasury, 2007, p.242). 
 
According to Cook et al (2018, p.5) productivity was at the ‘apex of the policy narrative’ in 
the UK between 1997 and 2010, and 2015 onwards. The lacunae followed the financial 
crises when the policy agenda was obsessed with austerity and fiscal retrenchment.  It may 
also be the case, that productivity has fallen down the policy agenda since 2016 as the 
policy discourse has been hijacked by Brexit. Despite this, the UK Government has 
introduced a new industrial policy where productivity is placed centre stage.  The strategy 
has identified five ‘foundations of productivity’: ideas, people, infrastructure, business 
environment and places (HM Government, 2017).  The strategy has many similarities with 
Labour’s five drivers:  the ‘ideas’ foundation aims to make the UK  the ‘world’s most 
innovative economy (HM Government, 2017, p.14) but ‘place’ seems more prominently 
identified as a foundation of productivity growth. 
 
There are four key characteristics of the role of innovation in recent industrial policy. First, 
innovation is considered as one of the key drivers or foundations of productivity but it is 
important to emphasise that it is not the only driver – and the importance of individual 
drivers (and their interactions) may vary by place.  Second, the focus of the innovation 
driver has focused on the development of new innovations from the science base.  A 
consistent thread across the policy ‘churn’ has been the targeting and support of R&D and 
encouraging the commercialisation of science (Cook et al, 2018, p.15).  More recent 
developments such as the establishment of intermediary institutions such as Catapults and 
the identification of ‘grand challenges’ support the development of new innovations and are 
not primarily concerned with diffusion. It should be noted that some policy documents 
promulgate a wider concept of innovation (see DIUS, 2008) but the reality of policy 
implementation is narrower, as a Parliamentary Select Committee inquiry observed: ‘While 
the government’s rhetoric marks a step change…the government’s approach appears to be 
evolutionary’ (BEIS Strategy Committee, 2017).  Third, the institutional framework to 
support innovation has undergone regular shifts.  The Labour Government regionalised 
some of the support for innovation including through the Regional Development Agencies 
(RDAs). The RDAs had teething problems when they were established, with one concern 
that they were engaged in place competition in innovation; but they developed their 
competences and maturity – and then they were scrapped. Following the abolition of the 
RDAs, innovation support programmes became more centralised through the Technology 
Strategy Board (later Innovate UK).  Fourth, place is now identified as a central foundation 
of productivity but implementing an innovation policy that focuses on the generation of 
innovations may do little to improve regional growth and imbalances. 
 
 
3. Limitations of modern innovation policy 
 
A common focus of policy is to conflate technology with innovation.  Technology is a 
narrower concept than innovation which encompasses the technological aspects of 
products and processes, whereas innovation – at its most basic -  is ‘the successful 
exploitation of new ideas’ (DIUS, 2008, 12).  Innovation can vary in terms of products, 
services, processes and business models and occurs in the private, public and third sectors 
(Christopherson et al, 2008).  Yet, many policy initiatives concentrate support on the narrow 
aspects of technological innovation such as support for R&D and on support for technology 
transfer from universities.   
 
The convenient target- the ‘rhyming couplet’ of R&D 
One of the most pervasive tools to encourage innovation is support for R&D – including 
direct funding or incentives for the private sector to invest in R&D. The UK public sector 
funds R&D in various departments and in other sectors of economy such as in the higher 
education sector (Hughes and Martin, 2012).  In 2015, the UK Government (including 
research councils) was the second largest source of funding investing £6.5 billion (21% of 
total UK R&D funding) (ONS, 2018a).  This funding has various components but it is primarily 
focused on the generation of new technologies. The UK government has initiated an 
Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund to increase funding in R&D by £4.7 billion as part of a 
‘long-term plan to raise productivity and earning power in the UK’ (UKRI, online).  Fothergill 
et al have argued that the initiative ‘is targeted at R&D in an exceptionally narrow range of 
sectors’ that are ‘truly at the most exotic, leading edge of technology’ and that ‘the list has 
been shaped by research scientists rather than by business leaders grappling with real-world 
pressures to design, produce and sell to the rest of the world (Fothergill et al, 2017, p.4). 
They argue that the sectors involved account for only around one per cent of the UK 
economy and that the research activities are very unevenly spread across the UK (Fothergill 
et al, 2017). 
 
Incentives for the private sector to increase R&D are usually through a ‘tax credit’ or an 
‘enhanced allowance’, the former reduces liability to corporation tax and the latter allows 
companies to deduct R&D expenditure from taxable income (Fowkes, Sousa and Duncan, 
2015). According to a survey by the European Commission (EU and other comparator 
countries) 21 of the 33 countries had a tax credit scheme and 16 had an enhanced 
allowance scheme (European Commission, 2014). The impact of R&D tax credits has 
provided mixed results (see Hall and Van Reenan 2000 and Becker, 2014). The European 
Commission reported that R&D tax credits are effective in stimulating investment in R&D 
but identified three important limitations to this conclusion (2014, p.5-6). First, the ‘size of 
this effect are widely diverging and are not always comparable across countries due to 
differences in methodology’. Second, ‘rigorous studies’ show that foregone tax revenue due 
to tax incentives is higher than increased expenditure on R&D. Third, the impact of R&D tax 
incentives on innovation and productivity is not well studied.  
 
One of the problems with studies that try to estimate the impact of incentives on R&D 
expenditures is that they are frequently based on data collected by tax authorities which 
may bias the data.  If you ask those given tax benefits whether those benefits are working it 
is no surprise that the answers will be the affirmative particularly if there is flexibility in 
accounting practices that allows some reallocation of corporate expenditures to the R&D 
category. The more important challenge is to identify an impact of R&D incentives on 
innovation activities (including products, processes and business models).  A study by Kitson 
and Primost (2005) tracked the innovation activities of 21 firms in the British aerospace and 
biotechnology sectors. All the firms in this study identified R&D tax credits as a help to their 
activities but all indicated that it had no direct impact on their research and development 
activity. The benefit of the tax credit was that it improved cash-flow or it reduced the cash-
burn rate but it had no direct impact on the decision to develop a technology or to increase 
R&D .  
 
The conflation of R with D also masks many of the differences (albeit blurred differences) 
between the two concepts. Research is often divided between ‘basic’ and ‘applied’ which  
often does not take account of the interactions between research of different types. Stokes 
(1997) suggested an alternative framework where research was categorised as the pursuit 
of fundamental understanding (pure basic research) or solely with application (pure applied 
research) or with both (user-inspired research). Whichever taxonomy is preferred, research 
is part of the learning process whereas development is primarily  concerned with application 
of the research to provide functional use.  It has been contended that the UK is strong in R 
but not in D.  Haldane (2018b, p.7) has argued that: ‘Typically, we think of ‘Research and 
Development’ (R&D) as a rhyming couplet. In the UK’s case, the R and the D do not seem to 
rhyme. The UK does R well, as a world-leading innovation hub. But it does D poorly, where 
the D refers not just to development but the diffusion and dissemination of innovation to 
the long, lengthening, languishing lower tail. When it comes to innovation, the UK is a hub 
without spokes.’  
 
Another concern with R&D incentives is that they are a tool that is narrowly focused on a 
small range of sectors and a small number of firms. According to the EU R&D Scorecard: 
‘The top 2500 global R&D companies in the Scoreboard (all with R&D over €25m) account 
for approximately 90% of the world’s business-funded R&D’ (Hernández, 2018).  
Furthermore, R&D is very concentrated: an analysis of the 2500 global companies investing 
the most in R&D shows that the top 10 companies contributing 15% of the total, the top 50 
contribute 40%, and the top 100 contribute 53% (Hernández, 2018). In the UK, 75% of 
private R&D spending is concentrated in just 400 companies (HM Government, 2017).   
 
This skewness is not surprising as R&D is a partial and incomplete indicator of innovation, 
many firms that do not engage in significant levels of R&D are still producing innovative 
outputs or engaged in other forms of innovative activity (Abreu et al, 2008a). Arundel et al 
(2007, p.3) observed that: ‘R&D is not the only method of innovating. Other methods 
include technology adoption, incremental changes, imitation, and combining existing 
knowledge in new ways. With the possible exception of technology adoption, all of these 
methods require creative effort on the part of the firm’s employees and consequently will 
develop the firm’s in-house innovative capabilities. These capabilities are likely to lead to 
productivity improvements, improved competitiveness, and to new or improved products 
and processes that could be adopted by other firms. For these reasons, the activities of 
firms that innovate without performing R&D are of interest to policy.’  They may be of 
‘interest to policy’ but they are often marginalized or ignored.  According to PwC (2017, p. 9) 
new forms of innovation ‘such as open innovation, design thinking, and co-creation with 
partners, customers, and suppliers, are now all embraced ahead of traditional R&D, and by a 
wide margin— almost twice as many companies favor these models.’ 
 
It is important to emphasise that innovation is not solely the domain of high-technology 
manufacturing firms; it is also important in services as well as other mundane parts of the 
economy. Evidence from the Community Innovation Survey shows that 50% of UK 
innovating firms conducted no R&D in 2006-08 (BIS, 2011, p.97).  Abreu et al (2008b) 
identified high levels of ‘hidden innovation’ in the UK services sector but this innovation in 
services rarely depended on R&D. Innovative services firms were not developing new high-
technology products but finding new solutions to their customers’ problems or needs, which 
often did not involve technology. Arundel et al (2008, p.3) argue that ‘non-R&D innovators 
are relatively more dependent than R&D performing firms on the diffusion of knowledge 
from other firms, particularly through knowledge embodied in acquired products and 
processes.’  
 
Universities as sources of technology 
Innovation policy in many advanced and emerging economies has increasingly focused on 
the strategic role of universities to increase the commercialization of science and the 
transfer of technology (Abbas et al, 2019; Kergroach et al 2018; OECD, 2013). This is 
illustrated by UK’s policy framework. 
 
‘As well as increasing overall funding for research and development, the 
Government will continue to work with universities and research institutions to 
further improve the economic impact of research investment.  We need to ensure 
that university spin-outs have the best chance to survive, attract investment and 
grow over the long term. With a view to spreading best practice the Government will 
commission research on different institutions’ principles and practices on 
commercialisation of intellectual property, including how they approach licensing 
intellectual property and take equity in spin-outs.’ (HM Government, 2017, p.32) 
 
This focus is putting increasing pressure on universities to change strategy and put more 
resources into commercialisation. According to the Witty Review (2013, p.6): 
‘Universities should assume an explicit responsibility for facilitating economic growth, and 
all universities should have stronger incentives to embrace this “enhanced Third Mission” – 
from working together to develop and commercialise technologies which can win in 
international markets to partnering with innovative local Small and Medium Enterprises’.  
 
The focus on the commercialisation of science and technology transfer is consistent with the 
convenient narrative that science is key to innovation.  It is also useful as it provides a 
framework to capture metrics to judge the success (or impact) of universities.  But reliance 
on measuring indicators of commercialisation such as patents, licences and spin-outs is 
flawed.  As Goodhart (1981) observed: ‘any observed statistical regularity will tend to 
collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes.’ Thus, metrics of 
commercialisation may be artificially inflated to improve the ‘measured’ impact of a 
university – simply, encouraging and promoting technology transfer when it may not be 
appropriate. Technology transfer is an important element of the knowledge exchange 
spectrum, but it is only one set of mechanisms through which universities influence 
innovation which is not prominently recognised in much of the policy discourse (see Salter 
et al, 2000 and Hughes and Kitson, 2012).  Collaborations between universities and business 
also includes more widespread knowledge exchange mechanisms which include people-
based, problem-solving and community orientated activities (Hughes and Kitson, 2012; 
Lawson et al, 2018).   As  Einstein allegedly observed: ‘not everything that can be counted 
counts and not everything that counts can be counted’ (attributed to Albert Einstein).   
Additionally, knowledge exchange is not restricted to STEM disciplines but includes 
academics from the arts and humanities and the social sciences (Lawson et al,2016 ).  This 
reflects that businesses collaborate with academia not just to develop new technologies but 
to improve wider innovation including processes and business practices.  A study UK 
business showed a wide range of motives to collaborate with academia including support 
the introduction of a new product or a new process; to support service development; and to 
improve firms marketing and sales (Hughes and Kitson, 2013). 
 
The focus on technology transfer is a partial and distortionary picture of the range of 
knowledge exchange activities in the UK where there is a high degree of connectivity 
between the academic community and other parts of the economy.  The focus on 
universities to produce science that has impact may distort the broader contribution of 
universities. Haldane (2018a, p.21) has made the case to: ‘…….broaden the scope and 
purpose of universities. In future, these would develop a broader set of capitals – beyond 
human capital (in people) to include physical and intellectual capital (in firms). And they 
would do so throughout the lifecycle of companies, not just in their early years. As it 
happens, this would also be consistent with Newman’s original conception of universities as 
diffusion-engines, every bit as much as innovation-engines.’ There are, however, limits to 
what more can be wrung from Universities, which are facing competing pressures whilst 
increasingly operating under funding constraints (Christopherson et al, 2014).  In the UK, 
many Universities are often expected to be centres of global research excellence whilst also 
having an impact on the national and local economies.  These objectives may conflict and 
the ‘increased focus on the role of universities to improve innovation and economic growth 
should not distort or divert from the foundations of scholarship on which the substantial 
past success and social legitimacy of universities has been built’ (Hughes and Kitson, 2012 p. 
747).  
 
The focus on generation not diffusion 
Much of innovation policy is concerned with the generation of new technologies but there is 
less focus on the diffusion and use of such technologies.  The ‘development’ of new 
technologies alone has only a small economic impact as technology-producing sectors are 
relatively small in terms of employment and as a share of national income (Christopherson 
et al, 2008). Thus, the creation of  ‘high-technology clusters’ will, in most cases not have a 
major impact on local economies. The diffusion and use of technologies, however, does 
have the potential to have a major impact on national and local economies.  But such 
diffusion can be difficult, costly and take time; constraints that can be reduced by 
appropriate policy initiatives.  One of the architects of modern growth theory that stressed 
the importance of technology observed in 1987  that: ’you can see the computer age 
everywhere but in the productivity statistics’ (Solow, 1987). ICT technologies were being 
developed in the 1980s but were not widely deployed through the US economy.  By the 
mid-1990s, ICT technologies were widely deployed and productivity was growing rapidly in 
the US. And the sectors that were driving productivity growth were the innovation-using 
sectors which were also large in terms of employment or income shares. According to Solow 
(2001), the three industries which contributed most to the productivity surge in the USA 
from 1995 to 2000 were wholesale trade, retail trade and financial services. 
 
An article in the New York Times in 2001 reported that 'Europeans assume that American 
growth is driven by Silicon Valley . . . That view is wrong.' (Postřel quoted by Freeman et al, 
2011).  Postrel focuses on productivity growth in the retail sector and argues that a sixth of 
that improvement is attributable to one company - Wal-Mart.  Solow further commented on 
the US productivity surge: ‘By far the most important factor in that is Wal-Mart….. That was 
not expected. The technology that went into what Wal-Mart did was not brand new and not 
especially at the technological frontiers, but when it was combined with the firm’s 
managerial and organizational innovations, the impact was huge (quoted in Schräge, 2002).  
Furthermore, Solow argues that key factors are ‘imitation, adaptation and organizational 
innovation that he believes traditional economists either minimize or ignore. Our historical 
research emphasis focusing on measuring R&D spending as a proxy for innovation is 
probably a mistake’ (quoted in Schräge, 2002).  This led Schräge (2002) to conclude that:  
‘This revolution…..reinforces a profound truth about the economics of innovation: 
implementation matters far more than invention.’ 
 
The diffusion of innovations requires understanding the specific environment and dynamics 
of each sector or region (McKinsey, 2002). In the UK, there is a range of evidence which 
shows slow and erratic diffusion of innovations. Evidence from the Community Innovation 
Survey shows relatively low rate of new products and process innovations (Eurostat).  The 
adoption of advanced technologies is also erratic . The Bank of England has analysed the 
adoption rates of six technologies (mobile access to email, documents and software, 
websites with online ordering, fast broadband access and electronic data interchange sales) 
which shows ‘a patchy picture of technological adoption among UK companies, with a long 
tail of slow-adopters of basic and especially advanced technologies’ (Haldane, 2018b, p.10). 
In the service sector many businesses lack the skilled personnel or the intelligence on 
markets and the appropriate technologies that would enable them to become more 
innovative (Abreu et al 2008b).    
 
There are many different aspects of the diffusion of innovation but a common requirement 
is the effective movement and exchange of ideas and knowledge. This requires 
building connections to sources of ideas and expertise which requires investment - either in 
individuals who can develop and facilitate networks - or to build intermediary institutions.  
There have been many initiatives in this realm including the Catapult Programme in the UK 
which is based on the more extensive Fraunhofer Institutes in Germany.2  But these 
initiatives are primarily science-based and are to remedy limitations in the technology 
transfer process. They are not primarily concerned with the broader process of knowledge 




2 As of April 2019, there are 10 Catapult Centres:  Cell and Gene Therapy; Compound Semiconductor 
Applications; Digital; Energy Systems Future Cities; High Value Manufacturing (a network of another seven 
centres); Medicines Discovery; Offshore Renewable Energy; Satellite Applications; and Transport Systems. 
See: https://catapult.org.uk/catapult-centres/.  For a discussion of the challenges facing the Catapult Centres, see 
Bailey and Tomlinson  (2017). 
4. The Spatial Dimension 
 
The focus on innovation is not simply a national phenomenon, it has acquired importance at 
the regional and local levels. In the UK, for example, the improvement of regional  
innovation has increasingly been highlighted as important for both regional and national 
economic growth (BEIS, 2017; BIS, 2011; HM Government, 2017).  Similarly in the EU, there 
is greater focus on ‘creating the eco-systems that encourage innovation, research and 
development (R&D) and entrepreneurship’ (European Commission, online).  Innovation is 
seen as crucial to improving local and regional productivity which in turn should increase 
national productivity. Of course, productivity is not the only target of economic policy but as 
Krugman observed: ‘productivity isn't everything, but, in the long run, it is almost 
everything. A country's ability to improve its standard of living over time depends almost 
entirely on its ability to raise its output per worker’ (Krugman, 1997, p.11 ).  This of course, 
applies at the local and regional levels as well as the national level, and the ‘standard of 
living’ in this context equates to higher real wages in addition to higher profits and tax 
revenue.   
 
There are large and widening productivity variations across the regions in the UK (Kitson et 
al, 2004; Martin 2009). These spatial economic imbalance are historicaly entrenched and 
persistent and are a major challenge for policy particularly as ‘other OECD countries have 
devolved or federalized systems of political-economic governance that seem to work more 
effectively and productively than the UK’s over-centralised model, and most enjoy much 
greater regional economic balance’ (Martin and Gardiner, 2017).  Figure 4 shows the 
regional variation in labour productivity (measured as gross value added per hour worked) 
in the UK in 2016.  Only London and the South East (together sometimes called the Greater 
South East) had productivity above the UK average; with Wales and Northern Ireland having 
the lowest levels of labour productivity. Differences in labour productivity between regions 
may reflect structural differences and or firm-level differences.  Some regions have a higher 
concentration of higher productivity sectors compared to other regions; whereas some 
regions may have similar industrial structures but there may be firm level differences in 
productivity between regions. Analysis by the ONS (2017) has disaggregated the sources of 
regional productivity differences in non-financial businesses which are shown in Table 1. 
Column 1 shows the labour productivity index in the UK regions in 2014 (where the 
UK=100). Column 2 shows the firm productivity index which shows the average level of 
productivity in a region assuming the industry composition in that region is the same as for 
the national economy.  Column 3 shows the average level of productivity in a region 
assuming the productivity of each industry in that region is the same as nationwide average 
for that industry which shows the effect of industrial composition on the region’s 
productivity. Column 4 shows a residual covariance term which reflects the interactions 
between the firm index and the industrial composition index.  
 
[Figure 4 and Table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 suggests that variations in firm level productivity help to explain much of the 
variations of regional productivity. For instance, firm level productivity in London (the 
highest region) is more than twice that of Wales (the lowest region).  The industry 
composition index explains less of the regional variations in productivity.  For instance, 
industrial composition in Scotland (the highest region) is only 14% higher than that in South 
West the lowest region). Overall, the ONS data suggests industrial composition is not a 
major explanation of regional productivity differences as it  is firm level variations that help 
to explain much of the variations.  But a note of caution is required as there may be a 
significant variations in the operations and activities of firms that are designated as being in 
the same industry which may conceal the impact of industrial structure.  
 
Further analysis of firm level variations in productivity is shown in Figure 5 which shows the 
productivity distribution of UK firms compared to French and German firms (Haldane, 
2018b). There is a higher share of UK firms in the upper tail compared to French and 
German firms but there is a smaller share in the middle and a much bigger share (a fat tail) 
in the lower end of the distribution.  According to Haldane (2018b): ‘the UK is in many 
respects a tale (tail) of two companies: a small set in the upper tail gazelling along the 
productivity high road and a much larger set in the lower tail snailing along the low road’ (p. 
4). Furthermore, Haldane (2018b) argues that the fat tail of companies are spread across 
the regions of the UK and that they operate significantly below the technological frontier of 
the leading firms and this can help to explain the productivity slowdown in the UK. 
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
In the UK, the recent emphasis on improving regional innovation reflects both the 
application of the conventional innovation narrative to different spatial levels combined 
with the concern that national innovation policies may exacerbate regional disparities.   
Howells (2005) has observed that a ‘top-down’ national innovation policy that focuses on 
R&D may benefit relation successful core regions whereas disadvantaged regions will 
benefit least. This is an example of the ‘Matthews effect’ (Merton, 1968 ) where high R&D  
regions may be in a virtuous cycle where they attract more R&D whereas low R&D regions 
are in a vicious cycle where they fail to attract R&D (Antonelli and Crespi, 2013). 
Furthermore, Oughton et al (2002) have identified a ‘regional innovation paradox’, whereby 
lagging regions may not benefit from policy interventions as they have a relatively low 
capacity to absorb innovation funds compared to more advanced regions.  
 
The argument that increasing R&D in lagging regions will substantially boost regional (and 
national) growth and productivity is a seemingly plausible local dimension of the pre-
eminence of science-innovation narrative. In the UK, a common illustration of this narrative 
is to plot R&D intensity against regional GDP which displays a positive correlation. The 
correlation is weak and London does not fit the story but that does not stop correlation 
being assumed to be causation, leading to clarion calls for more support R&D in the lagging 
regions.  According to Forth (2018), ‘R&D investment seems to be one of the few ways of 
boosting underperforming regions that works in the long-term.’  Similarly, Jones (2018) has 
argued: ‘There’s one factor that, unless urgently addressed, will hold UKRI back from its 
mission of making a significant difference to the UK’s overall productivity problems and 
raising the economy’s R&D intensity. That is the extraordinary and unhealthy concentration 
of publicly funded R&D in a relatively small part of the country – London, the Southeast, and 
East Anglia.’ Yet, it is questionable whether differences in R&D intensities are 
‘extraordinary’, ‘unhealthy’ or are holding back the UK’s overall productivity problem.   
 
Application of the science-innovation narrative is now part of place-based policy. The UK 
Prime Minister declaimed: ‘Our challenge as a nation, and my determination as Prime 
Minister, is not just to lead the world in the 4th industrial revolution – but to ensure that 
every part of our country powers that success. That is what our modern Industrial Strategy 
is all about’ (May, 2018). According to HM Government (2017, p15): ‘there are regional 
disparities in how the public sector and companies spend money on research and 
innovation, with UK public R&D funding heavily focused on the ‘golden triangle’ of Oxford, 
Cambridge and London. As well as continuing to unleash the excellence of institutions, we 
need to build on the excellence in research and innovation that exists in other parts of the 
country too, and ensure that capital, institutional influence and government attention is 
targeted there effectively.’ In the UK, the proposal is to create competitive funding streams 
to support clusters of research and innovation in all parts of the UK.’ (HM Government, 
2017,  p.115) 
 
The rhetoric has been strong but this strength is not apparent in the delivery and funding of 
policy –  which may reflect pressures on public spending due to austerity and the Brexit-
induced torpor in policy making .  The UK government has announced that it is ‘launching a 
new competitive £115m Strength in Places Fund to support areas to build on their science 
and innovation strengths….. The fund will support collaborative programmes based on 
research and innovation excellence in places right across the UK which can demonstrate a 
strong impact on local productivity.’ (HM Government, 2017, p. 85). Funding at the level 
currently allocated will do little to address the spatial disparities in R&D funding across the 
UK but will provide the opportunity to undertake some policy experiments. The aim of the 
Fund is to identify and support areas of emerging R&D strength that will lead to stronger 
business clusters’ (Centre for Cities, 2018, p.4).  The Fund is targeted at those businesses 
and research organisations at, or near to, the frontier of the economy; and so will do little to 
directly promote innovation in lagging sectors and lagging firms.  
 
Universities are also part of the regional application of the science-innovation narrative.  
The national agenda is that there is ‘potential for universities to generate even greater 
economic value from research, for example through intellectual property licensing and spin 
out businesses’ (HM Government, 2017, p.171) and in addition ‘innovation clusters’ will 
form and grow around our universities and research organisations, bringing together world-
class research, business expertise and entrepreneurial drive. These clusters can create 
thousands of skilled jobs in R&D, innovation and wider sectors, driven by the growth in 
science, technology, engineering and maths (STEM) skills’ (HM Government, 2017, p.67). 
 
The limitations of conventional spatial innovation policies 
Innovation should not be considered as a panacea for regional imbalances.  In some cases 
regional policy might be best to focus on more mundane but more effective interventions 
such as improvements to transport and investments in human capital.  Furthermore, it is 
important to note that the drivers or foundations of regional competitiveness are 
interdependent; and increased innovation normally requires investment in complementary 
assets such as  capital goods or skills. In particular, successful firms often require 
organizational investment combined with technological investment (Brynjolfssonet al, 2002; 
Haskel  and Westlake, 2018) and utilization and exploitation of  innovations requires high 
quality of management (Bloom et al, 2014).  
 
One additional problem with the application of conventional science-innovation policies to 
regions or cities is that the approach is too narrow for the requirements of many places. 
Conventional policy focuses on the productions of innovations rather than their diffusion 
and innovation-producing sectors are relatively small and will contribute little to most local 
economies. This is illustrated by Sir Paul Nurse’s observations on the UK Government’s 
investment in a graphene centre in Manchester. ‘It simply looked good, because you had 
the Nobel prize for graphene and people said, “Excellent. Let’s now invest in graphene.”….. 
It is not a bad thing to do, but the decision to do it should take a much wider perspective 
than simply having a couple of really excellent scientists. You have to think about all the 
surroundings. Maybe that is there in Manchester, but it needs to be factored into the 
decision making—not just the fact that you have a couple of Nobel laureates there’ (Nurse, 
2018).  Furthermore,  as many innovation generating places exploit the benefits of 
agglomeration, spatial ‘jam spreading’ may weaken national innovation capabilities. 
 
A second problem is the ‘universalism’ of policies, where it is assumed that similar policies 
will have a similar impact in different places (Kitson et al , 2004).  As noted above there are 
differences between R and D and the distribution is highly skewed across sectors  – this has 
a spatial dimension reflecting the multifaceted regional ‘faces’ of R&D (Wintjes and 
Hollanders 2010).  Variations in industrial structure and economic geography will have a 
major influence on the impact of policy. Thus, investing in innovation may have beneficial 
effects in some regions but not in others. As Oughton et al (2002) have identified, there may 
be significant variations in the absorptive capacity of regions to utilise innovation polices.  
Abreu et al (2008a) argue that differences in firms’ absorptive capacity are due to sectoral 
and technological specificities which differ across regions.  
 
In the case of the contributions of universities, it is important to acknowledge the 
contrasting roles that individual universities play in their local and regional economies 
(Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Kitson et al, 2009)  This will reflect the various strengths of 
different universities and the extent to which they are embedded in the local, national and 
international economies (Lawson et al, 2018) which may not be fully understood by 
policymakers (Charles et al, 2014). In particular there may be tensions and difficulties that 
limit the ability of universities to play an active role in the transformation of peripheral 
regions (Benneworth and  Nieth, 2019).  Haskel and Westake (2018, p. 225) argue that: ‘The 
benefits to providing science funding to a university in a disadvantaged town will be 
substantially muted unless the local community has the capacity to absorb the results of the 
increases research’. Furthermore, the focus on technology transfer ignores the potential for 
academia to engage with the community to improve wider innovation, including in 
established larger firms and in traditional industries. 
 
5.  An Alternative Approach to Spatial Innovation Policies 
 
There are two key elements to the latest turn in industrial policy. First, a greater focus on 
innovation  - albeit narrowly concerned with the production of innovations (Warwick, 2013).  
And second, some perfunctory allusion to the importance to place. In the UK, the UK 
promoted a local growth agenda, establishing Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPS) and other 
local initiatives (on which, see Bailey and Tomlinson, 2017; and Martin and Gardiner, 2017).  
But these initiatives are piecemeal are inadequately funded to have a major impact on the 
entrenched spatial divergences in the UK.  In the EU, the current elixir of growth is smart 
specialisation which prioritises ‘domains, areas and economic activities where regions or 
countries have a competitive advantage or have the potential to generate knowledge-driven 
growth and to bring about the economic transformation needed to tackle the major and 
most urgent challenges for the society and the natural and built environment’ (European 
Commission, online).  Although smart specialisation does not preclude policies to improve 
innovation diffusion (McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2015), the primary ‘domains’ are ‘R&D or 
innovation areas characterized by distinctive knowledge’ (European Commission, online) 
and the vast majority of smart specialisation policies have been narrowly focused on 
support for the development of new innovations (see case studies on smart specialisation 
discussed in OECD, 2013). 
 
Innovation policy at the local level requires both a wider perspective to encompass the 
varieties of innovation and the multiple dimensions of a local innovation system; and a 
narrower perspective to focus on the specific innovation needs of a region or local area.  In 
particular there needs to be great focus on the diffusion and use of innovations – including 
those innovations that were developed elsewhere – nationally and internationally.  This 
focus is consistent with competitive regional advantage (CRA) concept which emphasises 
collective and interactive learning processes that are context-specific and (often) spatially 
specific (Asheim et al, 2011; Boschma, 2014). Furthermore, the CRA approach ‘strongly 
rejected ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies (like R&D policy and neo-liberal policies) that are not 
embedded in particular spatial settings’ (Boschma, 2014). The strengths of the CRA 
approach is that it focuses on system failure, the importance of learning and the spatial 
context. A limitation is the emergence of policy dissonance, as when implemented CRA 
policy narrows to the normal focus on the development of new innovations (see policy 
instrument for regional innovation in OECD, 2011). 
 
Improved diffusion of innovations for some sectors of the economy requires national 
initiatives – retail, wholesale and transport facing similar innovation challenges in different 
places.  Other sectors have innovation needs which reflect the economic geography and 
economic structure of the local economy. Policy needs will be shaped by the specific 
characteristics of the local economy - similar policy interventions may lead to very different 
impacts in different places - but there are some common requirements.  First, innovation 
and innovation diffusion can benefit all sectors and firms – not just ‘high technology’ 
businesses of firms on the innovation frontier. Second, building networks that facilitate 
knowledge exchange to improve the diffusion of innovation that is appropriate for the local 
economy. Third, focus should be on long-term impact and policy should not shift based on 
short-term changes or temporary shocks. Metrics should not narrowly focus on hard 
economic indicators (such as GVA, patents etc) but should also include innovation 
trajectories and behavioural change which will provide better evidence of the long-term 
path of development. 
 
Although there are commonalities, the innovation requirements of different places will vary.  
Lester’s (2005) analysis of 22 regional economies from around the world provides a typology 
of the spatial variations of economic transformation processes delineating four processes: 
new firm formation; inward investment; diversification; and economic upgrading.  First, 
indigenous creation, the process that is commonly associated with the generation of new 
ideas and conventional innovation policies including support for R&D and the focus on 
technology transfer from universities.  Well known examples include the computer and 
information technologies around Silicon Valley and the software, electronics and 
biotechnology industries in Cambridge (Segal Quince Wicksteed, 1985).  These high-
technology clusters are an important part of the innovation system but they are not the 
panacea for economic prosperity in most localities as such activities form a relatively small 
share of national economic activity (Fothergill et al, 2017).  Second, inward investment 
which involves the movement of businesses into the area which needs to be aligned with 
the local economic base.  This may require the development of new supply chain and new 
clusters may develop (Tödtling-Schönhofer and Davies, 2013).  For instance, the arrival of 
Nissan in Sunderland led to the development of a local supply chain and links with further 
education and higher education establishments to improve access to skilled labour. Third, 
diversification is a process whereby an existing industry in a region may be in decline but its 
core capabilities are redeployed or transformed to encourage the emergence of a new 
industry. This may require developments in products, processes and business models which 
require the use of and deployment of existing innovations.  The development of a medical 
instrumentation industry in Sheffield reflects the legacy of the iron and steel industry.  
Fourth, industrial upgrading which requires the deployment of product, process and 
business model innovations to exiting sectors.  The redevelopment of Manchester has 
included the upgrading of the city centre to improve access to public spaces and consumer 
services.  The development of East Manchester is a successful redevelopment of derelict 
land to provide new sports facilities as well as space for residential and commercial uses.  
 
The above is a simple taxonomy, and multiple processes may be operating in one place at 
any one time, but it illustrates that  the ‘skills, resources and institutional capabilities 
associated with each type of transition are different’ (Lester, 2005, p.20).  Furthermore, the 
requirements of all the processes - especially inward investment, diversification and 
upgrading - require the ability to connect and absorb innovations.  This, in turn, will depend 
on the connective capacity and absorptive capacity of individual firms but it will also depend 
on the strengths of local networks to enable knowledge exchange. Such networks should be 
outward looking, connecting to local, national and global sources of innovation which are 
appropriate for the local economy and which ‘ensure variety and new innovation impulses’ 
(Tödtling-Schönhofer and Davies, 2013, p.20). Connecting to sources of ideas and 
innovations is difficult for many firms  - particularly SMEs which often lack the information 
about how to collaborate and lack the resources to implement  and manage connections 
(Hughes and Kitson, 2013).  Building local networks requires investment in intermediary 
institutions with skilled staff who understand the needs of the local economy and its 
transformation pathways.   
 
The role of local economic anchors, such as universities, will vary depending on the 
transformation pathway.  Whereas indigenous creation is often associated with technology 
transfer from universities; inward investment may require a greater focus on skills and 
education; diversification may require the cultivation of ‘technological links between 
disconnected actors’ (Lester, 2015, p,27); and upgrading may require more problem-solving 
activities (Hughes and Kitson, 2013 and Lester, 2015).  Rebalancing the impact of 
universities from ‘technology transfer’ to ‘knowledge exchange’ and broadening the 
innovation agenda to include innovation diffusion in addition to innovation creation may 
require a re-purposing of the university sector. Furthermore, universities can utilise their 
roles as economic anchors (they rarely move) and connectors to act as ‘innovation bridges’ 
to help local firms access ideas and innovation from outside the region or locality.3  But it 
important to express a note of caution as universities are under increasing competitive and 
financial pressures are expected to fulfil an expanding portfolio of roles and this is not 





Innovation policy at the local level requires both a wider perspective to encompass the 
variety of features of an innovation system; and a narrower perspective to focus on the 
specific innovation needs of a region or local area. The generation of innovations will not 
have a major impact on many local economies and thus science policy should not become 
an arm of local development policy. There is the risk of a ‘white coat syndrome’ where 
investment in science is considered essential to raising the pace of local economic 
development despite the relatively small number employed in pursuing scientific 
developments and the risk that the spatial spreading of scientific endeavours may 
undermine agglomeration benefits of focusing on centres of excellence. Policy should focus 
on the diffusion of innovations, but diffusion is costly and difficult and requires better 
knowledge exchange and boundary spanning skills.  There are sectors that comprise a large 
share of both national and local economies where the diffusion of innovations should be 
improved at a national level such as retail, wholesale trade, transport and logistics. The 
diffusion of innovations, however, will also be partly contingent on the structural specificity 
and specific needs of the local economy. The innovation needs of a local economy will vary 
according to the process of economic development including: new firm formation; inward 
investment; diversification; and economic upgrading.  Diffusion should encompass process, 
design, business innovations and should penetrate all sectors including ‘traditional sectors’.  
Furthermore, diffusion will be strengthened by building connectivity with local economic 
‘anchors’, such as universities and hospitals .  Such anchors are often considered as 
‘innovation-generating’ institutions; but they are also employers that do not tend to move 
and act as important sources of local resilience; and they are sources of knowledge and 
expertise that enhance the diffusion and adoption of innovations. Connectivity and 
collaboration may require the development of new local structures that align the interests 
and coordinate the activities of actors in the local innovation system including businesses, 
universities and government.  It is also important that policy is stable and uses appropriate 
metrics. Focus should be on long-term impact and policy should not shift based on short-
term changes or temporary shocks; metrics should not narrowly focus on hard economic 
indicators but should also include innovation trajectories and behavioural change which will 
provide better evidence of the long-term path of transformation and development. 
  
 
3 For examples of where universities have effectively collaborated with businesses and other parts of the local 
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Figure 3  The productivity slowdown: gross domestic product per hour worked, actual and 
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Note Estimated GVA (EBIT + employee costs) is regressed on a range of variables to control 
for sub-sector and number of employees using a Weighted Least Squares method (with 
employee numbers as the weighting). The output of this regression is used to compute an 
expected productivity, representing the average for a firm of that size in that sub-sector. 
The residual for each firm is plotted as a percentage of the median productivity for a firm in 
the same size bracket in the same sub-sector. 
 
 
 
 
